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OF CELL PHONES AND ELECTRONIC MAIL:
DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
UNDER DISCIPLINARY RULE 4-101 AND
MODEL RULE 1.6
KARIN MIK*
Technology has become a fact of life-perhaps nowhere
more so than in business and in the legal profession.' By the end
of 1997, it was reported that an estimated sixty million people
worldwide used the Internet,2 with the number of Internet access
lines growing nearly twenty times faster than traditional voice
phone lines.' Similarly, the global use of cellular phones has
risen from approximately eleven million users in 1990 to 135 mil-
lion users in 1996.' Commuting workers routinely conduct busi-
ness on cellular phones on their way to and from work.5
Despite the prevalence of these electronic communications,
the security risks of their use are well-known. It is common
knowledge that information sent via the Internet has the capacity
of being intercepted at an Internet server.6 It is also known that
cellular communications, because they are transmitted through
public airwaves, can be overheard on other types of common
communications equipment.7 These two facts would seem to
present a quandary for the attorney who is attempting to conduct
business efficiently, yet confidentially in compliance with the
Code of Legal Ethics.
Regardless of the known security risks, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to imagine a law firm in the twentieth century operat-
* Assistant Director of Legal Writing, Research and Advocacy, Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law.
1. See Carey R. Ramos & Curtis Carmack, Beware of Cyberspace Marauders,
N.Y.LJ., Feb. 24, 1997, at Si.
2. See Internet vs. The Carriers: The Challenge Goes Worldwide, 27 Bus. COMM.
Rrv. 8 (1997).
3. See id.
4. See Mario Osava, Communications: Global Change Moving at the Speed of
Light, INTER PRESS SERV., Aug. 8, 1997.
5. See Robert A. Clifford, Cellular Phones May Drive Drivers to Dangerous
Distraction, 20 CHI. LAw. 9 (Oct. 1997).
6. See Sharon Machlis & Mitch Wagner, E-commerce Brings Applause, Some
Fears, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 1, 1997, at IA.
7. SeeJeannine Aversa, Gingrich Cell Call a Reminder They Can Be Overheard,
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Jan. 12, 1997, at 8.
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ing without the technological advancements that make it possible
to communicate with anyone, anywhere, at any time.' These
advancements often enable immediate responses that are benefi-
cial to attorneys and clients alike. Cellular phone usage and elec-
tronic mail are an integral mode of communication between
firm members, negotiating attorneys, as well as between attorneys
and their clients.9 While it has developed into a mode of com-
munication making the practice of law more efficient,1" it is
doubtful that most attorneys give too much thought to what
exactly happens to the content of their message as it either trav-
els along Internet phone lines or is relayed from cell phone ter-
minal to cell phone terminal.11
The prohibition on disclosing confidential communications
is one of the cornerstones of the legal profession.12 To that end,
Disciplinary Rule 4-101 of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility provides: "[A] lawyer shall not knowingly reveal a
confidence or secret of his client." 3 Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.6 provides: "A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents
after consultation . "..."14 Neither one of these ethical standards
8. Cell phone Interview with Gerald B. Chattman, Managing Partner of
Chattman, Gaines & Stern, L.P.A. (May 5, 1998). Chattman reports that he
averages about 2500 minutes a month of cellular phone usage. His cellular
phone includes a speed dial feature, a call waiting feature, and a "world-wide
roam" feature. The world-wide roam enables anyone to dial his local cell
phone number and contact him wherever he might be, whether out-of-state or
out of the country.
9. See id.
10. See Stephanie Simon, Internet Holds Appeal for Online Attorneys, CHI. SUN
TIMES, July, 11, 1996, at 35.
11. Even if attorneys are aware of security risks, it is doubtful whether all
clients have the same knowledge of those risks. See Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F.
Tellam, Competence and Confidentiality in the Context of Cellular Telephone, Cordless
Telephone, and E-Mail Communications, 33 WILLAAMETrE L. REv. 467 (1997).
12. See, e.g., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908).
13. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 4-101
(1981). Some variation of Disciplinary Rule 4-101 is included in the following:
GA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1997); ME. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.6(h)(1) (1998); MINN. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); NEB. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Rule 4-101 (1997); N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 4-101 (1997); N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); OHIO
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1998); OR. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1998); TENN. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1998); TEX. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.05 (1998); VT. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1997); VA.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101 (1997).
14. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). Some
variation of Model Rule 1.6 is included in the following: ALA. RULES OF
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contemplates a situation in which an attorney might reasonably
be expected to foresee that his or her communications with a
client were possibly being disclosed to an unknown audience,
such as exists when using electronic communications. 15 These
rules of Professional Responsibility should be updated to reflect
these technological advancements.
On December 21, 1996, the nation (if not the world)
learned of the potential dangers of cellular phone transmissions
when a Florida couple "fortuitously" overheard a conference call
between Republican officials concerning how they could limit
political damage caused by the allegedly unethical activities of
Newt Gingrich.1 6 The "fortuitous" eavesdropping (which was
done over a police scanner) was taped and turned over to Demo-
crat Congresswoman Karen Thurman.17 She shared it with Con-
gressman Jim McDermott."5 Although it is, in fact, illegal to
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); ARIZ. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1997); ARK. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); COL. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); CONN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); DEL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1997); D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); FLA. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6 (1998); HAW. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1998); ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); IND. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); KAN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6 (1998); Ky. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT SCR 3.130 (1.6) (1998);
LA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); MD. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); MASS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); MICH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1998); Miss. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); Mo. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6 (1997); MONT. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); NEV. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 156
(1997); N.H. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); N.J. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); N.M. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 16-106 (1998); N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1998); OKLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); PA. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); R.I. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6 (1998); S.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998); S.D.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); UTAH RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.6 (1998); WASH. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); W. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1998); WIs. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT SCR 20:1.6 (1998); Wyo. CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997).
15. See Confidentiality: Electronic Communications, Lawyers' Manual on
Professional Conduct (ABA/BNA) 401 (1998) [hereinafter Lawyers' Manual].
16. See Guy Gugliotta, A Congressman Takes it Personally to Court: Boehner
Sues McDermott Over Leaked Tape of Phone Call on Gingrich's Ethics Woes, WASH.
POST, Mar. 10, 1998, at A4.
17. See id.
18. See id.
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disclose intercepted cellular communications,19 this has little
bearing on the fact that the communication was disclosed in the
first place. In fact, the notion that a cellular phone conversation
may be broadcast through a baby monitor 20 or stereo speaker 21
would seem to make any user hesitant about discussing any sensi-
tive topic over a cellular phone.
By the same token, electronic mail is not directly shipped
from one computer terminal to another. Rather, it has the
potential of stopping at various servers along the way and is sus-
ceptible to being viewed by parties unknown. 22 In the most
extreme of espionage-like circumstances, computer hackers are
able to intercept messages or perhaps access a file of stored e-
mail messages. 23  In some instances, even deleted e-mail
messages may be accessed by an individual intent on discovering
their content.24
On the one hand, it may seem as though modern advances
in technology pose no more confidentiality problems than the
invention of the telephone or even conference calling. However,
the advances of the cellular phone and Internet communication
have posed unique and perhaps yet-to-be-discovered confidenti-
ality problems.25 In order to tap "land" telephone lines, the per-
petrator must act deliberately and with some technological
knowledge.26 Land line telephone calls, unlike cellular phone
calls, do not ordinarily have the potential to be received on com-
monly possessed radio equipment. 27 The user of a telephone
need not worry about inadvertent broadcasts to homes or nearby
offices.
Additionally, the market that called for a quick and mobile
form of communication has given rise to its own market that calls
for experts who are able to penetrate any minimal security on
19. See 18 U.S.C. §2511(1) (1994), as amended by 18 U.S.C. §2511(1) (e) (i)
(Supp. II. 1996). See also 47 U.S.C. §605(a) (1994).
20. See Lawyers' Manual, supra note 15, at 404.
21. See Anthony S. Higgins, Professional Responsibility-Attorney-Client
Privilege: Are Expectations of Privacy Reasonable for Communications Broadcast Via
Cordless or Cellular Telephones?, 24 U. BALT. L. REv. 273, 280 (1995).
22. See Bert L. Slonim, E-mail and Privileged Communications: What are the
Security Concerns?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 24, 1997, at S3.
23. See David Hricik, Confidentiality & Privilege in High-Tech
Communications, 60 TEX. B.J. 104, 115 (1997).
24. See Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M. Kort, Discovery of E-mail and Other
Computerized Information, Aiz. Arv., Apr. 1995, at 18.
25. See Hricik, supra note 23.
26. See id.
27. See Lawyers' Manual, supra note 15, at 404.
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this relatively insecure technology.28 In fact, there are actually
groups of cellular hackers whose hobby is listening in on cellular
communications of attorneys or other business decision mak-
ers.29 While these individuals must possess a similar technologi-
cal expertise as "land line" wiretappers, there is a major
difference. A wiretap on a land line can be traced back to its
source.3 0 This is not necessarily true of the cellular hacker who
needs to install no wiring to receive a cellular signal, but needs
only a certain type of receiving equipment.
E-mail, on the other hand, presents a series of different
problems. It is not necessarily a problem of an individual inad-
vertently (or deliberately) intercepting an e-mail message, or
even looking over one's shoulder to read what is on the screen; it
is more the central technology of the system. E-mail requires a
networking system that in effect links every computer in the
world having access to the Internet.3 1 Given the system, it is
impossible to predict how many individuals may have access to a
particular e-mail message. 2 Moreover, the utmost benefit of the
computer is that information is kept in files-categorized effi-
ciently and capable of easy day-to-day access. As long as the files
exist, and as long as the computer is linked by phone lines to
other computers, there is the potential that the files may be
accessed by an outside source.33 This access could actually be
obtained by way of a law firm's Web site on the Internet.
34
While it may appear that owning a computer, in and of itself,
presents a far greater danger than using e-mail, it is the e-mail
and the technology of signals traveling along phone lines that
presents the greatest danger of a breach of confidentiality. Espi-
onage need no longer consist of spies secretly photographing
sensitive documents with miniature cameras; it need only consist
of e-mailing an entire file across the globe. In fact, it is even
quite easy to reveal a confidence inadvertently when accidentally
e-mailing confidential information along with an intended
transmission.3 5
28. See Privacy, and More, at Risk, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 1998, at 14A.
29. See Lawyers' Manual, supra note 15, at 401.
30. See Stephen Budiansky, Spying on Phone Calls and Bank Teller Machines:
Cheaper Electronics Makes it a Snap to Snoop, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 18,
1987, at 54.
31. See Jonathan Rose, E-Mail Security Risks: Taking Hacks at the Attorney
Client Privilege, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 179, 197 (1997).
32. See id. at 198.
33. See id. at 199-201.
34. See Ramos & Carmack, supra note 1.
35. See CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz, 916 F.Supp. 404 (D.N.J. 1995).
1999]
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Given that neither the Model Code nor Model Rules address
electronic communications directly, several states have issued
ethical opinions concerning the confidentiality of both cellular
phone and electronic mail communications. For example, both
North Carolina 6 and the city of New York3 7 have chosen a mid-
dle ground with respect to attorneys engaging in cellular phone
communication. Such communications are not forbidden, but
the attorney should use caution when communicating about sen-
sitive matters, and perhaps apprise the other party that the
phone line may not be secure. Other states, such as Massachu-
setts,3" New Hampshire," Washington,4 ° Colorado,4 1 Iowa,4 2 and
Illinois,4" require a type of "informed consent." The client must
be made aware that the cellular conversation may be overheard
and that the material discussed may not be confidential. Wash-
ington requires that the client be given the option of discussing
the material at a more secure time and place.4 4 Colorado, Iowa,
and Illinois require that the client be advised that the conversa-
tion may result in the loss of the attorney-client privilege.4 5
Opinions concerning the use of e-mail are similar. States
such as Alaska,4 6 Arizona,4 7 Illinois,48 South Carolina,49 Colo-
rado,50 and North Dakota5" have issued ethical opinions requir-
ing that "reasonable care" be employed when using e-mail to
communicate with a client. Encryption (or other means of secur-
ity) should be considered when sending confidential materials.
The state of Alaska's ethical advisory board suggests that a "pru-
dent" lawyer would advise the client of the risks of e-mail,5 2 and
the state of Arizona suggests a statement of confidentiality be
included with an e-mail message. 53 North Carolina requires the
lawyer to "minimize the risk" of electronic communication and
36. See N.C. St. Bar Op. RPC 215 (1995).
37. See New York City Ethics Op. 94-11 (1994).
38. See Mass. Ethics Op. 94-5 (1994).
39. See N.H. Ethics Op. 91-92/6 (1992).
40. See Wash. Informal Ethics Op. 91-1 (1991).
41. See Colo. Ethics Op. 90 (1992).
42. See Iowa Ethics Op. 96-1 (1996).
43. See Ill. Ethics Op. 90-7 (1990).
44. See Wash. Informal Ethics Op., supra note 40.
45. See Ethics Ops., supra notes 41-43.
46. See Alaska Ethics Op. 98-2 (1998).
47. See Ariz. Ethics Op. 97-04 (1997).
48. See Ill. Ethics Op. 96-10 (1997).
49. See S.C. Bar Advisory Op. 97-08 (June 1997).
50. See Colo. Ethics Op., supra note 41.
51. See N.D. State Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm. Op. 09 (1997).
52. See Alaska Ethics Op., supra note 46.
53. See Ariz. Ethics Op., supra note 47.
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advise the client if a security breach is feared.54 Iowa, alone, has
issued an opinion requiring written acknowledgment of the risks
by the client before the attorney may use e-mail as a means of
communication." If written acknowledgment from the client is
not received, e-mail communication must be encrypted.56
There are various ways the Model Rules and State Codes of
Professional Responsibility could be modified to account for the
advancements in technology. These modifications should take
into account the state ethical opinions already issued and incor-
porate them into a new version of the rule respecting confiden-
tial communications. Communication via e-mail or cellular
phone need not be prohibited. Instead the rules should reflect
the dangers of such communication to make the attorney aware
of potential breaches of confidentiality and consequent breaches
of ethical responsibility.
The main difference between Model Rule 1.6 and Discipli-
nary Rule 4-101 is the latter's use of the modifier "knowingly." As
such, DR 4-101 prevents "knowing" confidential revelations by
the attorney, while Rule 1.6, in many respects broader, prohibits
revealing any information relating to the representation of the
client.57 Since the word "knowingly" does not appear in the pro-
hibition, Rule 1.6 arguably applies to both knowing disclosures
and inadvertent disclosures.
In considering an appropriate integration of electronic com-
munications into the rules, the following suggested rules are
plausible renditions of what the new rules might include. These
suggested modifications take into consideration ethics opinions
that have already been issued, as well as the reality that the perva-
siveness of electronic communications potentially extends
breaches of confidentiality beyond attorneys. Because of this, the
suggested modifications expand an attorney's duties further by
imposing upon the attorney an obligation of notifying non-attor-
ney employees and clients of the potential inadvertent disclo-
sures of electronic communications.
54. See N.C. Ethics Op. 215 (1995).
55. See Iowa Ethics Op., supra note 42.
56. See id.
57. Except with consent or when necessary to carry out appropriate
representation. See, e.g., OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101
(1998).
1999]
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Suggested Modification of Disciplinary Rule 4-101:58
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(D), a lawyer shall
not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvan-
tage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advan-
tage of himself or of a third person, unless the client
consents after full disclosure.
(C) The term "knowingly" shall not only refer to purposeful dis-
closures of confidential communications, but shall also refer to
situations in which the attorney has reason to believe or should
have reason to believe that the mode of communication being
used is not secure. The reasonably prudent attorney should take
steps to ensure that particularly sensitive matters are not dis-
cussed with clients or other individuals over cellular phone com-
munications or e-mail communications without the consent of
the client involved, or without taking steps to ensure the method
of communication is secure.
(D) A lawyer may reveal ...
(E) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his
employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized from
disclosing or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that
a lawyer may reveal the information allowed by DR 4-101(D)
through an employee. An attorney shall exercise reasonable care
in apprising those with whom he/she has communications that
caution should be used when communicating sensitive materials
over electronic medium. If the firm is not working within a
closed computer network, the attorney should apprise his/her
non-attorney employees that discretion should be used when
using electronic mail as a means of communication.
Suggested Modification of Model Rule 1. 6:5"
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to repre-
sentation of a client unless the client consents after con-
sultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation. A
lawyer shall be considered to have revealed information
relating to representation if he/she has reason to
believe or should have reason to believe that the mode
58. Suggested modifications to the original are indicated by bold-face
type.
59. Suggested modifications to the original are indicated by bold-face
type.
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of communication being used to communicate informa-
tion is not secure.
(b) The reasonably prudent attorney should take steps to
ensure that particularly sensitive matters are not dis-
cussed with clients or other individuals over cellular
phone communications or e-mail communications with-
out the consent of the client involved, or without taking
steps to ensure the method of communication is secure.
An attorney shall exercise reasonable care in apprising
those with whom he/she has communications that cau-
tion should be used when communicating sensitive
materials over electronic medium. If the firm is not
working within a closed computer network, the attorney
should apprise his/her non-attorney employees that dis-
cretion should be used when using electronic mail as a
means of communication.
(c) A lawyer may reveal ...
These suggested modifications to Model Rule 1.6 and Disci-
plinary Rule 4-101 take into account technological developments
while informing the attorney that he or she is ultimately responsi-
ble for ensuring communications are kept confidential, whatever
mode of communication is chosen. The modifications also place
upon the attorney the responsibility of understanding the tech-
nology he or she is using for communication and apprising both
clients and employees of any risks involved. Further, the modifi-
cations eliminate the ability of the attorney to plead ignorance as
to the capabilities of modern technology, or as to his or her pre-
cise responsibility under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
CONCLUSION
The attorney-client privilege and its corresponding require-
ment to keep information confidential is, in many respects, a
sacred privilege that ranks with clergy-parishioner and doctor-
patient relationships.6 ° The concept of the privilege stems from
the honor of the profession and the Code of Professional
Responsibility is a testament to the tradition of confidentiality
that it protects. While the original Code bound the attorney to
the honor of keeping confidentiality in a more straightforward
way by not revealing secrets or using "secrets" to a client's disad-
vantage, 6' technology has given the attorney a way of breaching
his or her ethical responsibility without being overtly aware of
doing so.
60. See Ramos & Carmack, supra note 1.
61. See supra text accompanying note 13.
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 129 1999
130 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
Although the original notion of keeping client confidential-
ity did not contemplate the insecurities of electronic communica-
tions, these communications are a reality. They are something
which should be addressed by the legal profession, and corre-
spondingly, the rules governing the legal profession. The Code
of Professional Responsibility should be modified to reflect the
realities of these technological advancements and bind the law-
yer to the honor of keeping confidences on the much broader
scale that now exists.
HeinOnline  -- 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 130 1999
